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The story begins with the imagery of a billboard. A newborn baby
lies in an incubator covered with tubes going into and out of his body.
The caption reads: "He couldn't take the hit. If you're pregnant,
don't take drugs."2 While such an image is universally recognized and
understood today, little more than a decade earlier few would have
made any connection.' Within a span of just a few years in the mid1980s, the issue of prenatal drug exposure went from being nonexistent to omnipresent.4 And once this new social problem was discovered, armies of private and public bureaucrats emerged from their
5
cubicles with a call "to do something" about it.
Laura E. G6mez's Misconceiving Mothers is about that step-how
prenatal drug exposure went from its discovery as an issue to its ultimate institutionalization within the state apparatus. 6 G6mez sees the
remarkable success of the issue as the result of the confluence of two
political trends dating from that period: the beginning of the war on
drugs and the renewed assault on abortion rights.7 Her overview is
not politicized and does not attempt to advocate any particular solution for the problem. In fact, the "problem," such as it is, exists only
as a backdrop for her sociological analysis of the process itself. G6mez
contends that this process from discovery to institutionalization was
fundamentally political in nature.' Various actors competed to define
the issue according to their terms and to leave their stamp on the
problem's solution.9 What is of particular interest to G6mez is how
the treatment of prenatal drug exposure as an issue underwent a dra1. LAURA E. G6MEZ, MISCONCEMNG MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE
POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG ExPOsURE (1997).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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matic transformation as it went through this process. 1" The issue first
came to the public's attention by virtue of media hysteria over the
crack epidemic; initial reports were harsh and censorious of women
who used drugs while pregnant,1 yet attempts by the government to
treat prenatal drug exposure as a criminal issue utterly failed. Instead,
the government expanded social services to offer treatment for preg12
nant drug users.
In this review, I will critique G6mez's attempt to explain this
tricky phenomenon. In Part I, I will summarize her analysis. G6mez
sets out to demonstrate how the dynamic nature of social problems
affected the government's response to prenatal drug exposure.1 3 In
particular, she argues that a coalition of women's rights organizations
and medical professionals managed to shape the eventual "solution"
by redefining the "problem."' 4 In Part II, I will assess her arguments
and explain what I think we can learn from them. G6mez's analytical
framework offers much to those who are interested in how various
political actors interact in attempting to address emerging social
problems. Her treatment of the legislative process in particular reaffirms the old adage that, in politics, perception is reality. Her subsequent analysis of how prosecutors dealt with prenatal drug exposure,
however, is curiously inconsistent and fails to account fully for the institutional differences between prosecutors and legislators.
I.

GOMEZ'S ANALYSIS

Social problems, says G6mez, have predictable life cycles that consist of two main stages. 5 First, there is the discovery phase, in which the
16
problem is first identified and brought to the people's attention.
Second, there is the institutionalizationphase, in which the problem is
7
officially catalogued and handled, chiefly by the government.'
G6mez focuses on institutionalization in part because it,"highlights
the constructed nature of social problems."18
10. See id. at 119.
11. See id.at 15-16.
12. See id.at 119.
13. See id.at 8.

14. See id.at 62.
15. See id.at 7. G6mez adopts theories developed over the past half century in the
literature on social problems. See, e.g., Richard C. Fuller & Richard R. Myers, The Natural
History of a Social Problem, 6 AM. Soc. REv. 320 (1941); see alsoJoseph W. Schneider, Social
Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 ANN. REv. Soc. 209 (1985) (providing a brief
history of the sociological study of social problems).
16. See G6MEZ, supra note 1, at 7.

17. See id.
18. Id. at 8.
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G6mez examines two areas where this institutionalization has
taken place: the state legislature (where the law is made) and local
district attorney's offices (where the criminal law is implemented). 9
She focuses on California because of its reputation as a bellwether
state and because of its size. 2 ° G6mez sees the institutionalization process as inherently political, involving competing "claims-makers" who
seek to define and "own" an issue.2" "Claims-makers" are parties who
attempt to bring attention to particular issues to encourage action
dealing with those issues.2 2 They "own" an issue by first controlling
the public discourse surrounding the issue and then controlling the
23
collective response to it.
A.

The Discovery of the "Crack Baby" Problem and the
Legislative Response

G6mez firsts recounts how the whole "crack epidemic" began. In
1986, papers across the country began running stories about a new
drug hitting the streets of America: crack. 24 Initial reports were sensationalist, suggesting that crack cocaine was somehow special, that it
was more addictive than powder cocaine. 25 Following soon after these
initial reports came stories about premature babies born with serious
health problems.2 6 The two phenomena were inevitably linked in the
media, and the term "crack baby" was born. 27 Papers ran stories pro19. See id.
20. See id. at 4-5.
21. See id. at 6.
22. See id.; see also MALCOLM SPECTOR &JOHN KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS
73, 78-81 (2d ed. 1987).
23. See G5MEZ, supra note 1, at 6; see aISoJOSEPH GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRVNG AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER 10 (1981). Gusfield sees his concept of "ownership" as analogous to Spector and Kitsuse's "claims-making." See id. at 197
n.5. But while Spector and Kitsuse consider a "claim" to be something the claims-maker
thinks he or she is entitled to, see SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 22, at 78, the concept of a
"claim" does not address the power required to shape the issue. The concept of "ownership," on the other hand, does not address the possibility of competition among social
activists. It therefore seems appropriate for G6mez to treat the two concepts as distinct.
24. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 11. The very first use of the word "crack" appeared in
the New York Times on November 17, 1985. See Donna Boundy, Programfor Cocaine-Abuse
Under Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1985, lWC12.
25. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 11. More recent studies have concluded that there are
no differences in pharmacological effects. See id. Early reports also suggested that crack
was 90% pure cocaine. See STEVEN R. BELENKO, CRACK AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-DRUG
POLICY 5 (1993). Estimates by the Drug Enforcement Agency, however, put the figure at
anywhere between 5 and 40%, depending on the sample. See id. at 6.
26. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 12.
27. See id. The health risks of cocaine to unborn fetuses have been largely overstated.
See id. at 22-25. See also Claire D. Coles et al., Effects of Cocaine and Alcohol Use in Pregnancy on
Neonatal Growth and Neurobehavioral Status, 14 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOcY 23, 31-32
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filing some of the most serious drug users, treating them as if they
were representative. 2' G6mez points out that the portrayal of crack
and its users often reflected traditional stereotypes about racial minorities. 29 These stories had a tremendous impact on public opinion. A
1989 poll showed that eighty-two percent of the people polled felt that
pregnant women who used crack should be jailed for child abuse.3" In
another survey, however, when the question was asked without specifically referring to crack, the number was only about half.3 1
No sooner had stories of an epidemic of crack-addicted babies
appeared when legislators began proposing solutions to the problem.
G6mez outlines the various legislative efforts to deal with prenatal
(1992) (finding prenatal cocaine exposure affects fetal growth but does not otherwise impair a child physically or behaviorally); Bertis B. Little et al., Is There a Cocaine Syndrome?
Dysmorphic and Anthropometric Assessment of Infants Exposed to Cocaine, 54 TERATOLOGY 145,
146 (1996) (finding no combination of dysmorphic features to distinguish cocaine-exposed infants from non-exposed infants); Albert J. Tuboku-Metzger et al.,Cardiovascular
Effects of Cocaine in Neonates Exposed Prenatally, 13 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 1, 4 (1996) (finding
no direct effects of chronic cocaine use among pregnant women on cardiac health of
newborns); Nanci Stewart Woods et al., Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Maternal Depressive
Symptoms and Infant Neurobehavior Over the First Month, 16 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 83, 92
(1993) (finding no differences in neurobehavioral performance of cocaine-exposed infants as compared to non-exposed infants). One of the most egregious examples of media
hysteria is found in the media's enthusiasm for statistics. Dr. Ira Chasnoff, an early leader
in prenatal drug exposure research, found in 1989 that 11% of newborn infants had been
exposed to alcohol or illicit drugs. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 22 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff,
Drug Use and Women: Establishinga Standard of Care, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 208 (1989)).
A simple extrapolation from this figure yielded some 375,000 children nationwide. See
GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 22. The day after Chasnoff announced this at a press conference,
newspapers across the country were carrying stories claiming that 375,000 "crack babies"
were born each year. See id.
28. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 16.
29. See id. at 15.
30. See PUB. OPINION ONLINE, October 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Group File,
Beyond Two Years.
31. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 26. There are a number of problems with G6mez's use
of poll data here. First, she cites different surveys conducted at different times. See id. The
"other" surveys, in fact, were taken up to two or three years after the first. See, e.g., Rorie
Sherman, Bioethics Debate: Americans Polled on Bioethics, NAT'L LJ., May 13, 1991, at 1; George
Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll: Most Support Norplantfor Teens, Drug Addicts,
L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at Al. Second, not all of the poll questions are close enough in
form and substance to warrant a valid comparison. For example, the Los Angeles Times
survey asked respondents whether Norplant should be mandatory for drug-using women of
childbearing age. See Skelton & Weintraub, supra, at Al. Nevertheless, G6mez's central
assertion that the media frenzy had a rousing effect on public opinion seems secure. A
more telling figure comes from tracking the results of periodic surveys questioning respondents as to what they consider to be the most important issue facing the country. Ajanuary
1985 New York Times survey revealed that fewer than 1% of Americans identified drugs as
the most important issue. See War: 1 Percent. Drugs: 54 Percent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, at
A26. By September 1989, however, that figure had reached 54%. See id.
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drug exposure and how they came to be implemented.3 2 The first two
bills dealing with the issue were introduced into the California Legislature in 1986." 3 Over the next ten years, the number would reach
57.34 G6mez concludes that the flurry of media reports fueled legislative interest.3 5 In support of this conclusion, she points out that 26 of
the 57 bills-nearly half-were introduced during the 1989-90 legislative session.3 6 She then takes a look at the incidence of stories related
to the issue in California's two largest newspapers.3 7 Of a total of 148
such stories published from 1985 to 1992, some 40% of them came in
38
1989-90, coinciding with the peak of legislative activity.
G6mez states that legislators relate to claims-makers in two ways.
First, they are the primary audience for the first-round claims-makers
among academia and in the media who first discover the issue. 39 Second, they serve as claims-makers in their own right.4 ° Politicians, she
notes, often seize upon hot issues in an effort to make names for
themselves or to carve out ideological niches.4 1 G6mez finds an example of this in the first two bills proposed in the California legislature.4 2
One, sponsored by Senator Gary K Hart, would have made available
more money for "high-risk infants," including those born with illicit
drugs in their system.4 3 The other, sponsored by Senator Edward
Royce, would have amended the child abuse laws to protect fetuses.44
What these two very different bills were both trying to do, asserts
G6mez, was define the issue according to each senator's political
views. 4 5 Hart, a liberal Democrat, was seeking to define the issue as
one implicating public health.4 6 Royce, a conservative Republican,
was seeking to define the issue as one implicating public morality.4 7
32. See

GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 27-40.
33. See id. at 27. Neither bill was enacted into law. See id.
34. See id. at 28. This would be out of a total of some 7500 bills, but given the specificity
of the issue, G6mez considers the number to be rather high. See id.
35. See id. at 32.
36. See id. at 36. The year 1989 was also when the United States invaded Panama to
arrest Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking. See BELENKO, supra note 25, at 7.
37. See G6MEZ, supra note 1, at 29. The two papers examined are the Los Angeles Times
and the San Jose Mercury News.
38. See id. at 30. Few of these stories had anything to do with reporting on the progress
of the legislation. See id.
39. See id. at 33.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. (citing S.B. 987, 1985-86 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1986)).
44. See id. (citing S.B. 1070, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1987)).
45. See id. at 28.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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G6mez further stresses the importance of political symbolism.
Prenatal drug exposure was a perfect candidate for the "politics of
substitution," where a narrow issue is subliminally connected with another, more potent issue.4" The biggest such connection that was
made was with abortion.4 9 Abortion rights advocates in particular saw
this connection and fought hard against any attempts to punish
mothers who used illicit drugs while pregnant. 50 To them, such a
move could have proved to be the first step towards outlawing
abortion.5 '
G6mez notes that about one-third of all the bills addressing prenatal drug exposure introduced in the California State Legislature
were eventually signed into law. 52 No punitive measures, however,
even made it out of committee. 53 Despite the harsh tone of many of

the original reports in the news media,5 4 the bills the legislature
tended to pass were those that provided additional funds for education, health care, and other social services. 55 G6mez sees this seemingly contradictory result as the product of a political struggle
between rival parties attempting to define prenatal drug exposure in a
fashion palatable to their respective world views.5 6 She explains how,
early on, feminists and civil libertarians were galvanized by the 1987
prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart for child abuse after her newborn
infant died of complications of her drug use.5 7 The feminist attack
was two-fold. First, they portrayed this and any other prosecution as
an attack against women in general, forcing district attorneys to reconsider the use of existing laws to punish drug-addicted mothers. 51 Second, they went to the legislature and lobbied against any new criminal
48. See id. at 35.
49. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 37.
50. See id. at 38.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 41. This would be during the period between 1983 and 1996. See id.
G6mez points out that this rate is slightly lower than average for bills introduced into the
California State Legislature. See id. at 142 n.1 (citing Alan Rosenthal, The Third House:
Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States, CONG. Q., 1993).
53. See id. at 41.
54. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 15-16.
55. See id. at 41. The most important of these bills was the "Alcohol and Drug-Affected
Mothers and Infants Act" sponsored by Assemblywoman Jackie Speier. See id. at 58. First
introduced in 1989, it would create a state agency to fund medical and drug treatment for
impoverished pregnant drug-users. See id. It was passed by both houses of the legislature
before it was vetoed by Governor George Deukmejian. See id. at 59. The following year,
Speier reintroduced the bill, and it was ultimately signed into law by newly-elected Governor Pete Wilson. See id.
56. See id. at 41-42.
57. See id. at 42-43.
58. See id. at 43-44.
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provisions dealing with the issue. 5" Instead, they insisted that the
problem was medical in nature and that what these mothers needed
from the government was assistance, not incarceration.6" In this they
were helped by a much-needed alliance with the public health sector,
which gave them added nonpartisan clout. 6 G6mez considers this
coalition key to understanding how prenatal drug exposure came in
the end to be treated as a public health issue.6 2
B.

The ProsecutorialResponse

G6mez next turns to the California district attorney's offices to
see how local prosecutors dealt with the issue of prenatal drug exposure.6 3 She considers examining the thoughts and actions of prosecutors an interesting counterpoint to her look at the legislature for a
number of reasons. 64 For one, because of the lack of extensive public
scrutiny or contested elections, prosecutors are generally viewed as
apolitical.6 5 Moreover, prosecutors are in the position to implement
criminal policies as enacted by the legislature; this enables one to see
how the "law on the books" differs from the "law in action."66 Finally,
prosecutors differ from legislators in that each county has an independent district attorney's office as compared to the one legislative
body. This difference allows one to study the variation within the
statewide system of prosecutors.6 7
G6mez finds that most prosecutors consider prenatal drug expo68
sure an important issue, though not all have worked directly with it.
Their rhetoric is often consistent with the themes and tone of the
initial media reports, expressing a belief that crack is somehow "different" from other drugs69 and connecting the prenatal drug exposure
primarily with inner-city blacks.70 The prosecutors with whom she
59. See id. at 44.
60. See id. at 50.
61. See id. at 44.
62. See id. at 62.
63. See id. at 63. G6mez interviewed a total of 18 prosecutors representing 16 counties.
See id. at 64-65. Her selection was designed to be "both random and representative." Id. at
64.
64. See G6MEZ, supra note 1, at 63.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 63-64.
67. See id. at 64.
68. See id. at 65-66.
69. The San Diego district attorney's office, for example, distributed anti-drug pamphlets touting the difference in pharmacological effects between crack and powder cocaine without any scientific support. See id. at 67.
70. "[Iln the lower incomes, meth is the drug for white people, crack is the drug for
Black people, heroin is the drug for Hispanics." Id. at 69 (quoting San Diego County
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71
spoke were actually quite open about their reliance on these stories.
Unlike their counterparts in the legislature, however, the prosecutors
do not typically associate the issue with abortion.7 2 G6mez suggests
this may be because prosecutors are less politicized.7 3
G6mez then shifts from the prosecutors' words to their deeds.
She divides prosecutors into four distinct categories based on different prosecutorial strategies that have been publicized nationwide. 4
Offices are labeled either very punitive (policy to prosecute fully),
moderately punitive (policy to use prosecution to push mothers into
drug treatment 75 ), least punitive (policy to threaten prosecution to
push mothers into drug treatment 7 6), or inactive (policy against prosecution 7 7). Only one-third of the offices had ever prosecuted a woman for prenatal drug exposure, and G6mez places them in the "very
punitive" category. 78 A quarter of the offices had an express policy
against prosecution or had never considered prosecution ("inactive") .7 The remainder had considered prosecution at one time or
another but had not acted; these counties she does not count at all. °
G6mez notes the absence of any action in the middle categories and
concludes that, due to their tendency to collect at the extremes, prosecutors' policies on prenatal drug exposure are influenced by symbolic politics.8 "
Despite many prosecutors' interest in pursuing the issue, few had
actually brought forward cases against drug-using mothers.8 2 To explain this phenomenon, G6mez theorizes about what institutional fac-

District Attorney Ed Miller). Half of the prosecutors with whom G6mez spoke associated
particular drugs with specific racial groups, though many were uncomfortable with doing
so. See id.
71. See id. at 71.
72. See id. at 70.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 78.
75. Such a policy was widely practiced in Charleston County, South Carolina from 1989
to 1993. See id. at 79. Prosecutors would work with local hospitals to reach out to pregnant
drug users. See id. at 80. Women who tested positive for drugs would be charged with drug
possession and informed by the district attorney's office that they would have to undergo
drug treatment or be charged with child neglect as well. See id.
76. Such a policy is followed in the Second Judicial District of New Mexico in a program called "Addicted, Pregnant, and Busted." See id. at 81. Pregnant women arrested for
nonviolent crimes, such as prostitution or drug possession, are given the option of undergoing drug treatment in order to avoid prosecution altogether. See id.
77. See id. Inaction is not always the result of policy, however. See id.at 82-83.
78. See id. at 83.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 91.
82. See id. at 93.
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tors might cause prosecutors to balk at prosecuting. She comes up
with a number of possible reasons. For one, there is a general rule
against bringing weak cases.83 Cases of this kind usually involve tricky
questions of causation and intent that are difficult to prove. 84 Moreover, prosecutors have not had any support from other powerful societal institutions.8 5 First, the California State Legislature has chosen
specifically not to criminalize prenatal drug exposure, forcing prosecutors to stretch existing law in order to seek conviction.8 6 Second,
the courts have not accepted any of the theories prosecutors have
used in their cases. 87 Third, many local agencies, on whose assistance

83. See id. at 102.
84. See id. at 105. Under the California Penal Code, proving intent for child endangerment would not be much of an issue. Although in prenatal drug cases, the mother does
not likely intend to harm the fetus, California law requires only that the harmful act-in
this case, the drug use-be willful. See California v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1134
(1984). With any other crimes requiring specific intent, however, intent may indeed become an issue. Proving causation, however, might require extensive medical testimony.
See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 105.
85. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 108-14.
86. See id. at 108. Prosecutors in the seminal case of Margaret Velasquez Reyes, for
example, used the child endangerment statute:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to
be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation
where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four,
or six years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(a) (West Supp. 1998).
Although the prosecution secured a conviction against Reyes, the California Court of Appeal reversed on appeal. See Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 214, 216 (1977).
87. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 110. In Reyes, the California Court of Appeal rejected
the contention that drug use by a pregnant woman could constitute child abuse. See Reyes,
75 Cal. App. 3d at 216. Prosecutors had indicted Reyes for child endangerment under
§ 273a of the California Penal Code. See id. The court reversed her subsequent conviction,
holding that a fetus did not constitute a "child" as used in the statute. See id. at 216-17.
Prosecutors have lost every subsequent case at the trial court level. See G6MEZ, supra note 1,
at 110. Prosecutors in the Pamela Rae Stewart case argued that Stewart had failed to provide proper medical care for a child under § 270 of the California Penal Code. SeeJennifer
Warren, Woman is Acquitted in Test of Obligationto an Unborn Child, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987,
at BI. Despite the fact that the statute included a provision saying that "[a] child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is concerned," CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988), the court ruled that the intent of the statute
was only to make it more difficult for noncustodial parents to avoid paying child support
and dismissed the case. See Mitch Himaka, Judge Drops Prenatal Case Against Mother, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TIB., Feb. 27, 1987, at Al.
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prosecutors rely to make their cases, have often come out against
prosecution.8"
In spite of these obstacles, however, prosecutors in five counties
did bring cases against drug-using mothers.8 9 G6mez seeks to account
for why these counties broke the mold. She finds that these five counties share certain demographic and economic features. All five counties are roughly medium-sized, have had heavy population growth in
recent years, and have an increasing percentage of racial minorities.9 °
G6mez points out how uneasy the prosecutors with whom she spoke
are about the increased urbanization in their communities and how
they are afraid that they are becoming more like Los Angeles. 91 Moreover, each of these counties was9 2hit hard by an economic downturn in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
II.

CRITIQUE OF G6MEZ'S ANALYSIS

Misconceiving Mothers begins, appropriately enough, with an image; symbolism is at the heart of G6mez's analysis. Her approach is
"constructionist" in nature.9" She sees social problems largely as social
constructs, and the response to those problems comes after a change
in perception of the problems engineered by the interactions of different social actors.9 4 This differs from what G6mez calls an "objectiv88. Prosecutors rely on other local agencies in order to carry out their duties. See
supra note 1, at 111. For instance, they frequently interact with the coroner's office, child protection services, and medical personnel at public and private hospitals. See
id. G6mez points out two ways these bodies might affect prosecutorial action. First, other
local officials, particularly social workers, might convince the prosecutor that prosecution
might not be a wise strategy. See id. at 112-13. Second, such officials may actively compete
with the prosecutor for jurisdiction in a given case. See id. at 113. Because child protective
services and public health organizations handle prenatal drug exposure more directly than
do prosecutors, they serve as "gatekeepers" for many marginal cases and can block
prosecutorial action. See id.
89. See id. at 93. These would be the District Attorneys of Contra Costa, Kern, Riverside, San Bernadino, and San Diego Counties. See id. at 94.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 94-96.
92. See id. at 96.
93. "Constructionism" is a school of thought in the sociology of social problems. The
term derives from Spector and Kitsuse's 1977 book, Constructing Social Problems. See
SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 22, at 65.
94. See id. at 5. The classical constructionist definition of a "social problem" is "the
activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect
to some putative conditions." SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supranote 22, at 75. In another context,
Fuller and Myers put it more succinctly: "Social problems are what people think they are
.... " Fuller & Myers, supra note 15, at 320. For the purposes of this Article, I have been
using the word "problem" in its traditional sense referring to a negative social condition.
G6MEZ,
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ist" approach, 95 whereby social problems are seen as things in
themselves, and the response to those problems comes after they become too serious to be ignored. 96 As a constructionist, she demonstrates some skepticism about the nature of the problem itself 7
Many readers may be uncomfortable with G6mez's detached analysis,
which can be perceived as bordering on reductionism. From a purely
sociological perspective, however, she provides much insight into the
evolving treatment of prenatal drug exposure in the public policy
arena.
A.

Legislators and the Importance of Associations

G6mez's analysis of the legislative process reveals the importance
of associations. Because the "problem" is malleable, it can be defined
as individual claims-makers see fit. The real battle is therefore in establishing the right symbolic context with which to associate the issue.
In the legislature, for example, various early bills dealing with prenatal
drug exposure linked the issue with drug abuse9 8-reasonable
enough-but also welfare reform 99 and HIV-infected infants.1"'
G6mez somewhat ominously associates these issues with a tacitly racist
stereotype of inner-city blacks.1 0 1 Perhaps more importantly, however, this response was in line with the issue's portrayal in the media,
which shaped the legislature's perception.10 2 Because prenatal drug
exposure was, in its early stages, associated primarily with crack, an
illegal drug prominent in the inner cities, one can see how it took few
logical steps for legislators, particularly conservative Republicans, to
95. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 5. The term appears to be G6mez's own coinage.
Schneider calls them "social factists." Joseph W. Schneider, Introduction, in STUDIES IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS xii (Joseph W. Schneider & John I. Kitsuse, eds., 1984).
96. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 5-6. G6mez compares how an objectivist and a constructivist might approach the study of a social problem, taking the example of child abuse. See

id. The 1960s saw a dramatic rise in interest in the issue. See id. An objectivist would tend
to look for evidence of an increase in the frequency or severity of physical abuse to explain
this phenomenon. See id. A constructivist, on the other hand, would look to the social
context in which the issue arose. See id. G6mez mentions a widely-cited 1962 article in the
Journal of the American Medical Association as an example of the kind of outside influence.
See id.; see also C. Henry Kempe et a]., The Battered-ChildSyndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
97. Indeed, Spector and Kitsuse are adamant in rejecting any attempt to define a social
problem as an objective condition. See SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 22, at 74.
98. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 36 (citing S.B. 1661, 1989-90 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1989)).
99. See id. (citing A.B. 2205, 1991-92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991); A.B. 2772, 1991-92
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992)).
100. See, e.g., S.B. 1450, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1987); S. Con. Res. 98, 1988-89
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990).
101. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 37.
102. See id. at 14-15.
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regard it as a criminal matter.1" 3 Liberal Democrats, on the other
hand, were less prone to this association and tended to look for new
social programs to accommodate the needs of the afflicted."0 4
The breadth of the differences in the proposed solutions to the
problem would seem to support G6mez's assertion of symbolic politics. In her view, the battle over what to do about prenatal drug exposure served as a proxy for the more contentious abortion issue.10 5
The one problem with this assertion is that the connection between
criminalization of prenatal drug exposure and abortion was more
overtly made by opponents of criminalization than by proponents. Women's rights organizations fought hard to block passage of Republican punitive measures. 10 6 But, as G6mez admits, many pro-life forces
refused to participate in the battle. 0 7 Some thought the issue was too
peripheral to their primary concern.'
Others expressed concern
that were prenatal drug exposure to be criminalized, pregnant drugusers might choose abortion rather than face the risk of prosecution,
thus increasing the number of abortions."0 It is odd to see the ambivalence that many pro-life organizations felt towards prenatal drug exposure given the spirited opposition to criminalization of their usual
103. See S.B. 1070, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1987) (expanding child abuse statutes
to cover prenatal drug exposure) (sponsored by Republican Senator Ed Royce); S.B. 1465,
1989-90 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1989) (declaring death of drug-addicted baby manslaughter)
(sponsored by Republican Senator John Seymour); A.B. 2614, 1995-96 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1996) (criminalizing "fetal child neglect") (sponsored by Republican Assemblyman
Phil Hawkins).
104. See S.B. 987, 1985-86 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1986) (targeting state funds toward treatment for infants exposed to drugs in the womb) (sponsored by Democratic Senator Gary
K. Hart); A.B. 749, 1988-89 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1989) (establishing state agency to provide funding for drug treatment for pregnant drug addicts) (sponsored by Democratic
Assemblywoman Jackie Speier); A.B. 1824, 1989-90 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990) (expanding
Medi-Cal and Medicaid coverage to include drug treatment for pregnant drug addicts).
105. See id. at 37.
106. See id. at 41-42.
107. See id. at 39. Some readers might question whether this was, in fact, the case. Prolife forces did support the prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart. See id. at 42. They also
actively opposed bills sponsored by pro-choice Assemblywoman Jackie Speier. See id. at 39.
They failed, however, to support any of the punitive bills. See id. Speier's bills were
designed to provide funds to treat pregnant drug-users. See id. at 58. It is odd that pro-life
organizations would actively oppose legislation that did not appear to relate to their larger
political agenda, while failing to support legislation that did. Nevertheless, it does appear
that pro-life forces across the country remained ambivalent towards criminalization. See
also Dan Eggen, The Dilemma of Drug-abusingMons, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 31, 1996, at 1
(noting opposition of anti-abortion forces to criminalization of prenatal drug exposure);
Andrew Wolfson, Help, Not Jail, Urgedfor Pregnant Addicts, COURIER-J., June 10, 1990, at IA
(prosecution of drug-using mothers gives anti-abortion groups pause).
108. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 39.
109. See id.
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political opponents1 1 0 To the extent that it was a proxy fight, therefore, it was one-sided. This may help to explain the complete failure
of the California legislature to pass even one punitive measure.'
So,
what began as primarily an urban, lower-class issue coupled with the
war on drugs became entangled with broader-based gender issues and
a woman's right to choose.1 12 The particular effort on the part of
women's groups to define the issue as one potentially affecting all women broadened the scope of the problem and rendered it more difficult for the other side to prescribe harsh treatment for pregnant
women using drugs." 3
The importance of differing associations helps to explain the inevitable hypocrisy in some of the early criminal proposals. G6mez
skillfully juxtaposes her discussion of the inflated claims made about
the effects of crack cocaine on fetuses with important sidenotes on the
effects of alcohol and tobacco, as well as other substances.' 1 4 Yet the
prosecutors with whom she spoke talked specifically about "crack babies" and expressed some level of ignorance to the role of other
drugs. 1 5 G6mez recognizes that, especially in the political realm, perception is reality, and that those in power act on their perceptions of
social problems, which may or may not coincide with the actual problem. And, because prenatal drug exposure arose within the mediadriven context of the intensifying War on Drugs, legislators were unable to make a connection between the effects of cocaine and the effects of tobacco.
This brings us to another major point in Misconceiving Mothersthat it was the intense media attention to crack and "crack babies" that
drove legislators to act in the first place." 6 The coincidence in timing
is certainly suggestive." 7 It is particularly interesting for G6mez to
note that the peak of media and legislative interest so neatly coincided."' That would indicate not only a simultaneous rise in interest
but also a simultaneous drop. Had the media coverage merely brought
110. See id. at 38. Women's rights organizations may have had more at stake in the fight.
Valerie Green argues that criminalization of prenatal drug exposure could have even wider
repercussions than its putative impact on the abortion debate. See VALERIE GREEN, DOPED
Up, KNOCKED UP, AND... LOCKED Up? THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF WOMEN WHO USE
DRUGS DURING PREGNANCY 88-91 (1983).
111. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 41.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 121-22.
id.
id. at 12, 23-25.
id. at 66-67.
G6MEZ, supra note 1, at 29.
id. at 30.
id.
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the legislature's attention to the issue, one would expect a plateau of
legislative activity despite the media's turning to more current issues
to explore."1 9
G6mez adds further weight to her assertion that legislative action
with regard to prenatal drug use was largely media-driven by pointing
out the breadth of legislative interest. Nearly a quarter of the legislature had at one time or another sponsored a bill on prenatal drug
exposure. 120 Furthermore, many legislative insiders conceded the
role of the media in influencing public policy on this issue. One went
so far as to tell her, "You don't get a quarter of the legislature to introduce bills on a topic unless '60 Minutes' or Time or Newsweek or some
major media event or analysis has been presented that leads them in
that direction." 121
Unfortunately, G6mez's treatment of the media's role in the controversy fails to examine effectively how press coverage changed over
the years.1 22 Initial reports, she says, were harsh in tone and were influenced by classic stereotypes. 23 But, given her reliance on the media as a major impetus for legislative action, 124 she neglects to
demonstrate a shift in the tone corresponding to the shift in the ultimate legislative response. She instead relies on the alliance of women's groups and medical professionals to explain the shift in the
119. G6mez is careful enough to point out that few of the media reports at the time
were specifically about the progress of legislation. See id. at 30. She clearly recognizes the
possible argument that her data may be incestuous. She does not adequately rebut the
claim, however, as there still exists the possibility that legislative action may have influenced the media by providing an impetus to investigate the issues underlying the legislative
proposals. Belenko, for one, notes the existence of significant upswings in stories about
crack nationwide in conjunction with election years. See BELENKO, supra note 25, at 25. A
more likely hypothesis would be that the relationship between the media and the legislature is symbiotic, each one feeding the other. Nevertheless, given that the first media
reports preceded any legislative call to action, the initial mover was no doubt the media.
120. See G6MEZ, supra note 1, at 31. G6mez's actual figure is 34 out of 120. See id. She
warns, however, that the actual number of total legislators should be larger than 120 because of legislative turnover. In part to compensate, though, she counts only those
lawmakers who were primary sponsors of legislation rather than mere co-sponsors. See id. at
141.
121. Id. at 31 (quoting former Assemblyman Burt Margolin).
122. Earlier in the book, G6mez observes that, by the mid-90s, some in the media had
begun rethinking their overreaction. See id. at 18. See also, e.g., Editorial, False Alarm Over
"Crack Babies," ST. Louis Posr-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1995, at 6B; Ellen Goodman, The Myth of
the "Crack Babies," BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1992, at 69; Barbara Kessler, Drug-exposed Infants'
Future not Without Hope, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 30, 1995, at IA. She never follows up
on this observation, however, in her subsequent analysis of the media's role in influencing
public policy.
123. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 14-16.
124. See id. at 29.
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weight of "reform" on the side of socially progressive policies.

25

Many readers will be left wanting to know what role the media might
have played in the dissemination of their views.
B.

Prosecutorsand the Importance of Political Roles

G6mez's examination of prosecutors in this regard may seem
somewhat odd since they are not really in a position to make public
policy. The results of her study would appear to bear this out: very
little prosecutorial action was taken despite the heated opinions of
some of the prosecutors regarding the issue.' 2 6 G6mez is right to connect this, at least in part, with the failure of other state agencies, particularly the legislature, to act. 127 I do not think that she gives it the
weight it deserves, however.' 28 Her initial suggestion that examining
the actions of prosecutors is important because they serve as the "implementers" of criminal policy as enacted by the legislature never
quite pans out.1 29 Nevertheless, its importance is clear. District attor-

ney's offices deal with criminal issues derived ultimately from statutes
passed by the legislature. Prosecutors therefore operate downstream
from legislative policy, and anything they do-at least in theory-is
dependent on prior action by the legislature. G6mez earlier states
how, once a social problem is discovered, the question becomes how
to deal with it. i3 ° This is primarily a legislative function. As the legislature in this case had flatly decided against treating prenatal drug
exposure as a criminal matter,' ideally the issue should never even
have reached the prosecutor's desk. In this light, it is not surprising
that prosecutors made few attempts, typically muted attempts at that,
to deal with it.
That still leaves us with the question of why some prosecutors attempted to deal with prenatal drug exposure at all. In fact, the question becomes even more prescient than G6mez claims. 13 2 G6mez
believes that the two extremes in prosecutorial responses suggest symbolic politics are at work." 3' This would be at odds with the usual
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id. at 62.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 108-11.
G6mez only raises it after discussing the prosecutors' avoidance of weak cases. See
GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 102-08.
129. See id. at 63-64. G6mez also mentions the importance of taking into account the
less immediate political role of the prosecutor in her introduction. See id. at 4.
130. See id. at 4.
131. See id. at 41.
132. See id. at 93.
133. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 91.
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assumption that prosecutors are apolitical. 134 Interestingly, prosecutors did not make any connection between prenatal drug exposure
and abortion in the interviews she conducted. 1 35 G6mez thinks this
1 36
might be because prosecutors are less politicized than legislators,
but it seems inconsistent to suggest, on the one hand, that prosecutors
are playing politics and, on the other, that they are not political. The
explanation for this seeming contradiction, although never stated outright, is likely to be found in the prosecutor's function as an "implementer" of legislative policy. 137 Abortion being a legislative issue, it
would be less likely to be considered by a prosecutor. As claims-makers in their own right, prosecutors would most likely connect a new
social problem to something more directly within theirjurisdiction. It
is not that prosecutors are not playing politics; it is that they are playing politics of a different kind.
Indeed, G6mez's suggested political motivation for those prosecutors who did act does seem more appropriate for an institution that
does not decide upon great "political" questions. She is close to the
mark in arguing that matters such as demographic shifts (more racially diverse newcomers) and economic trends (downward) would be
the kinds of factors decisive in influencing prosecutors in those five
counties.' 38 But, on a broader level, such factors could just as easily
have influenced the legislators to act. G6mez does not sufficiently
take into account the unique role that prosecutors play within the system and how that role relates to the actions they take. The influences
she cites are enough to explain why action was taken but not what the
specific action was. She does not fully explain the "symbolic politics"
she attributes to the prosecutors.' 3 9 The demographic and economic
patterns to which she refers occurred in the five counties that actually
prosecuted, but G6mez earlier had noted that more than half of the
134. See id. at 63.
135. See id. at 70.
136.. See id.
137. See id. at 63-64.
138. See GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 94-97.
139. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Presumably, G6mez is referring to the
economic and demographic changes and the corresponding sense of a lack of "order"
which she says "relate to the prosecutor's function in an interesting way." Id. at 148 n.1.
The changing racial and ethnic make-up of the counties could easily have been connected
with crime and-given the initial media coverage of the issue-could well have been an
interesting factor to examine further as it could potentially fit neatly within her argument
about how social problems are associated with other issues. It is strange that she does not
go any further on this point, and goes this far only in an endnote, given how it relates to
her thesis. The other factors, however, are much too broad; it is hard to see just how they
relate to the prosecutor's function.
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prosecutors to whom she spoke had considered prosecution only to discount them in her subsequent analysis.' 4 ° She does not, however, distinguish the motivations of those prosecutors who had at least come
close to prosecuting drug-using mothers from those who actually went
through with it or, for that matter, with those who expressly rejected
prosecution as a matter of policy. Some of those who balked may have
done so only because of the failure of any other prosecutors to secure
a conviction.'
In the end, her analysis of prosecutorial action and
inaction lacks the necessary hook to tie it in with the constructionist
themes she sets out with.
CONCLUSION

Laura E. G6mez's MisconceivingMothers is an insightful analysis of
government action in response to the so-called "crack baby" epidemic.
More than that, however, it operates as a case study on the generally
malleable nature of social problems, illustrating how political power
and the contest among public policy advocates shape perceptions by
shaping the perceptions of the problem. My only caveat is that her
treatment of the legislature and of prosecutors does not satisfactorily
account for the fundamental differences in their character as institutions. Nevertheless, such a flaw does not go to the heart of her thesis
and does not detract in any sizable way from what the reader might
learn from it.

140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
141. Even four of the five counties that did prosecute only did so once. See GMEZ, supra
note 1, at 101.

